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I. INTRODUCTION 
1. Purpose and Scope 
Directors, by law, are the key individuals in 
any corporation. This study analyzes the boards of directors 
in the New England Electronics Industry. The scope of the 
thesis is limited to the general composition of the boards 
and the broad functions and responsibilities generally 
associated with directors. 
The purpose of this thesis is to establish a 
common denominator for this particular director group, and 
thereby aid the manager - or the student of management - to 
evaluate the board of a particular company. The yardsticks 
developed are generalizations, which after modification to 
the particular needs and peculiar circumstances of a company, 
may be used to study specific applications. The reader is 
cautioned that the findings are limited to the New England 
Electronics Industry, and in particular, to those companies 
within the financial group indicated. There are vast diff-
erences in the individual directors and the roles they per-
form which, when put together in a board, can produce 
practically limitless combinations. The pattern is never 
absolutely the same, and therefore, a penetrating analysis 
has to be made of the circumstances in each particular case. 
This study will have served its purpose if it causes a reader, 
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who is associated with a board, to reflect further on his 
own board's activities. 
The general purpose of a director is understood 
by most people, but few, outside of leaders and students 
of management, comprehend the importance of board activity 
in relation to their own environment. The board, as the 
ultimate management in the corporation, is responsible for 
the overall control and direction of the company. The New 
England Electronic Industry boards, as a composite group, 
control the companies which will probably have the greatest 
influence on the New England Economy in the forseeable future. 
New England electronic production will exceed $800 
million in 1960 - or approximately 15% of the expected total 
commercial and military market. Thi~ figure obviously pro-
vides ,the payroll for·many, many jobs which otherwise might 
not exist. The timely, phenomenal, growth of the New Eng-
land companies - 245% in the ten years from 1947 to 1957, 
and an additional 173% expected from 1957 through 1960 -
has more or less coincided with decreases in employment in 
other industries. ( 13) As other industries suffer further 
declines in employment, it becomes clearly evident that the 
future of the New England economy of today rests in large 
measure upon the ability of the Electronics Industry to 
continue its e&pansion. 
The requirement of more effective direction by 
the subject boards becomes increasingly more important as 
competition increases, as it has of late. West Coast firms 
and foreign imports from Japan, West Germany, The Nether-
lands, and England are bidding for a larger share of the 
market - companies in the California alone are expected to 
ship $1,600 million in 1960, or two times the total New 
. ( 13) England production for the same per1od. 
2. Research Sources 
a. Survey of the New England Electronics Industry 
The thesis interprets the responses of 80 companies 
to a mail survey performed by the writer in February, 1960. 
(See Appendix B for a copy of the questionnaire). These 
companies appear to represent a Talid cross section of the 
industry since, on a percent basis, the number replying by 
major productclassification are approximately consistent 
with the percent of companies in the same classifications 
for the total industry. Table I below, indicates, for 
example, that electronic component manufacturers comprise 
39~ of the industry, and that 33~ of the 80 replies were 
from the same major product classification. 
(Table I follows) 
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Table I 
Number of Companies Replying 
by Major Product Classification 
Survey - Board of Directors 
in Electronics Industry in Hew England, 
F.~ O'Driscoll,Graduate Schoob Boston Universith Feb. 1960 
Surve;r Total N.E. 
Number 
..L I 
Manufacturing Equipment 2 3 4 
Test Equipment 7 9 5 
Sub-Components & Supplies 28 35 40 
Components 27 33 39 
Sub-Equipment 11 14 9 
Equipment 5 6 3 
TOTAL 80 100~ 100% 
Classification Source - Who's Who in Electronics, 1959 
A total of 20~ of the 80 companies are listed 
for public investment. Two are listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange; four are listed in the American Stock 
Exchange; and ten are sold in the Over-the-Counter 
market. (3) 
The survey represents various size companies as 
measured by net worth, i.e. financial strength. The 
following analysis (Table II) indicates the number of 
companies in each category of estimated financial strength 
based on credit rating~y Dun and Bradstreet. 
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~able II 
lUmber of Companies Replying 
by Financial Iet Worth Classification 
Survey - Board of Directors 
in Electronics Industry in New England, 
F.~ O'Driscoll,Graduate Schoob Boston University,Feb.1960 
Bet Worth Replies ~ 
Over $1,000,000 23 29 
$500,000 - $1,000,000 12 15 
$100,000 - tsoo,ooo 1 1 14 
Under $100,000 13 16 
No Rating Available 21 26 
TOTAL 80 100~ 
Classification Source - Dun & Bradstreet Credit Reference 
File, December, 1959. 
There were no ratings available for 21 companies, 
but no opinions should be drawn from this fact alone. Dun 
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& Bradstreet does not rate all companies, and on occasion 
rates companies based on parent company strength. For the 
purpose of this survey, all such companies have been placed 
into the "no rating available" section. For example, Power 
Sources, Inc. of Burlington, Massachusetts is rated as having 
a financial net worth of over one million dollars. This 
rating is not based on its own strength, but rather that 
of its parent company Technical Operations, Inc. of Bur-
lington, Massachusetts. Therefore, Power Sources, Inc. has 
been placed in the "no rating available" section. 
The following is only a partial list of the 
companies that replied to the questionnaire: 
Company Product 
A. A. Metal Products Chassis 
Ambroid Co. 
Analex Corp. 
C & K Components 
C G S Labs. Inc. 
Electro-Flex 
Eugene Engineering 
Geartronics Corp. 
General Instrument 
Heli-Coil Corp. 
Hi-Voltage Engineering 
Jarrell-Ash, Co. 
K.V. Transformer 
Microwave Associates, Inc. 
Pickard & Burns, Inc. 
Power Sources, Inc. 
Republic Foil 
H.H. Scott, Inc. 
Technical Operations 
Technology Instrument 
Transonics 
Adhesives 
Tabulators 
Delay Lines 
Computers 
Heat Elements 
Sheet Metal 
Gear Systems 
Electronic Assembly 
Coils 
Accelerators 
Instrumentation 
Transformers 
Microwave Devices 
Power Devices 
Power Converters 
Capacitor Foils 
Hi-Fi Equipment 
Power Supplies 
Potentiometers 
Transducers 
1 1 
Company 
Vari-L 
Waterbury Pressed Ketal 
Wirecraft Products, Inc. 
B. Other Sources 
Product 
Inductors 
Electronic Hardware 
Cable-Wire 
This writer has relied principally upon two pre-
vious surveys of all corporations in the United States to 
provide comparative data for the New England Electronics 
Industry. One is a joint survey, made in 1959, of 925 
companies, representing large and small enterprises, by 
The National Industrial Conference Board and The American 
Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc.: the other, also 
made in 1959, is a survey of 500 large and small corpora-
tions made by the American Institute of Management. 
The writer has no knowledge of any previous study 
into the specific subject of the boards of directors in the 
New England Electronics Industry. The highly competitive 
nature of the business has made much of the most desirable 
information unavailable. Information on those companies 
li$ted for public investment is readily available from the 
prospecti required by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
but many of the companies not listed for public investment 
consider this data to be of a proprietary nature. 
3. Summary of the Study 
The following summary of the results of this 
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analysis will indicate the emphasis to be found in the main 
body of the text. Here, in condensed form, is an image of 
a board member, board control, and board activity to be 
found in the New England Electronics Industry. There are 
substantial variances at most points between those companies 
rated over $1,000,000 and those rated under this amount, 
therefore, each area of interest is separated into three 
categories: 1.) average of all companies, 2.) over 
$1,000,000, and 3.) under $1,000,000. 
a. Board Members 
1. Average all Companies 
There are six directors on each company board, or 
five less than the national average for all corporations. 
The "inside" management group had three members on the 
board, the other three were "outside" directors. 
The composition of the two groups is: 
"Inside" 
Administration and Sales 
Production, Engineering, and R&D 
Finance and Accounting 
Total "Inside" 
"Outside" 
Bus~nessmen in the same, related, or 
other industries 
Professional (Lawyers, Bankers, etc.) 
Others 
Total "Outside" 
48" 
35 
17 
me;~ 
The average director was 50 years old, approximately ten 
years younger than his average counterpart on a national, 
all industry, basis. Only 14~ of the "inside" and 59" of 
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the "outside" directors receive additional compensation 
for director activities. 
2. Average Company Rated Over $1,000,000 
There are eight directors on each board, three 
"inside" and five "outside" members. 
The composition of the two groups is: 
"Inside" 
Administration and Sales 
Production, Engineering, and R&D 
Finance and Accounting 
Total "Inside" 
"Outside" 
BUsinessmen in the same, related, or 
other industries 
Professional (Lawyers, Bankers, Etc.) 
Others 
Total "Outside" 
The average director in this group is 51 years old. More 
than 26% of the "inside" and 79% of the "outside" directors 
receive additional compensation for director activity. 
3. Average Company Rated Under $1,000,000. 
There are five directors on each board, three 
"inside" and two "outside" members. This distribution 
coincides exactly with that recommended for the small cor-
poration by the American Institute of Management. (1) 
The composition of the two groups is: 
"Inside" 
Administration and Sales 
Production, Engineering, and R & D 
Finance and Accounting 
Total "Inside" 
44% 
38 
18 
100% 
14 
"Outside" 
Businessmen in the same, related, or 
other industries 
Professional (Lawyers, Bankers, etc.) 
Others 
Total "Outside" 
Notice that the "others" category increases substantially 
in the smaller companies. This is caused by the fact that 
many times relatives are put on boards to either maintain 
control or satisfy statutory requirements. The average 
director in this group is 47 years old. More than 10~ of 
the "inside" and 79~ of "outside" directors receive addi-
tional compensation for director activity. 
B. Board Control 
A total of 56~ of all the boards surveyed are 
controlled by the "inside" directors. The boards of the 
companies rated over $1,000,000 are only 39% controlled 
by "inside" directors, this is low considering the youth 
of the industry and the fact that the national average for 
all corporations in 43~.(9l.s might be expected, "inside" 
directors control more than 75~ of the boards of companies 
rated under $1,000,000. 
c. Board Activity 
The use of committees by the subject boards does 
not correlate with information available from national 
surveys of all corporations. 
1. Executive Committee- use by: 
National average, all corporations(9) 75% 
A~l electronic companies surveyed 31~ 
Electronic companies rated over $1,000M 52~ 
Electronic companies rated under$1,000M 22% 
15 
2. Compensation Committee -use b:: 
National average, all corporat1ons(9J 
All electronic companies surveyed 
Electronic companies rated over $1,000,000 
Electronic companies rated under$1,000,000 
25% 
15% 
46~ 
-0-
There were other committees used, but these defy national 
comparison. 
Nationally, 38% of all corporations hold board 
meetings at least once per month;(9 \he same overall average, 
38%, is true of all the electronic companies surveyed. How-
ever, a relatively large range exists between the larger 
companies, of which 52% hold meetings at least once per 
month, and the smaller companies, of which only 30% have 
meetings in the same frequency. 
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II. COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD 
A study of the composition of a board reveals 
the balance of that board. From the balance of a board 
and the type of individuals who make up this balance, the 
analyst can reveal what may be expected of that board. 
It tells nothing of the actual service the board gives, 
for this depends upon how the board i·s used in practice. 
The first task is to set the desired function of the 
board, and then select the individuals to fulfill this 
function. 
The chief executive who wants a constructive 
board should- 01) 
1.) Think through what he wants from a board 
and put that into a written statement of 
responsibilities. 
2.) Develop scientific criteria against which 
the board can judge the company's health. 
3.) Subdivide the board into revolving com-
mittees, each to be thoroughly familiar 
with a specific segment of the business. 
4.) Prepare agenda and background information 
well in advance of every meeting. 
5.) Decide exactly what kind of man he wants 
on the board, and then recruit him just as 
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he would a top executive. 
6.) Compensate directors just as he would 
executives - in relation to qualifications 
and performance. 
1. Size of Board 
Size of the board is the first aspect of its 
composition that can be studied. There is no ideal size 
of a board, it depends upon the company's circumstances 
of control and the functions desired of the board. All 
the New England states require a minimum of three directors, 
with the exception of Rhode Island which allows the incorpor-
ators to set the number in the charter, articles of associa-
tion, or the bylaws. (See Appendix A, Legal Supplement.) 
The working boards of the 500 large and small 
companies in the American Institute of Management Survey 
averaged fourteen directors. Some outstanding manufacturers 
had fewer than ten men on their boards.( 1) A recent survey 
of 925 manufacturing companies conducted by the National 
Industrial Conference Board revealed an average of eleven 
directors per board. (9) 
The following table is ananalys~ of the 80 
companies in the survey of the Electronics Industry in 
New England. 
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!A:BLE III 
AVERAGE NUDER OF DIRECTORS PER COMPANY 
by Financial Iet Worth Classification 
Survey - Board of Directors 
in Electronics Industry in New England, 
F.J.O'Driscoll,Graduate School,:Boston University,Feb.l960 
JET WORTH 
Over $1,000,000 
$500,000- $1,000,000 
$100,000 - $500,000 
Under $100,000 
No Rating Available 
TOTAL 
REPLIES 
23 
12 
11 
13 
21 
-
80 
Source: Survey Questionnaire 
NUMBER OF 
DIRECTORS 
188 
66 
55 
49 
124 
482 
AVG.NO. PER 
COMPANY 
8 
6 
5 
4 
6 
6 
The results indicate that the average company in 
the survey with a net worth of over one million dollars has 
eight directors, or three less than the national average of 
eleven. This most probably results from the fact that the 
national average includes the banking and trust field, 
among others, which often have more than twenty members on 
the boardf1) Boards in this electronics survey ranged from 
five to thirteen directors, with a definite mode of 
approximately eight members. Microwave Associates, Inc. 
and Technical Operations, Incorporated were at the upper 
limit with thirteen board members, while Transonics, Inc. 
had only five. It is interesting to note that at a recent 
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meeting of the stockholders of Transonics, Inc. a motion 
was made from the floor to increase the size of the board; 
and in particular to add outside people. 
The smaller companies averaged approximately 
five directors, which is the recommended figure of the 
American Institute of Kanagement for small business.( 1 ) 
It is difficult for a board smaller than five to fulfill 
the functions of a working directorate. 
The proper size of an effective board can be 
stated as that large enough to fulfill its function and 
provide a variety of viewpoint, yet small enough to keep 
interest alive and allow a steady exchange of ideas. 
Boards occasionally grow too large because of mergers; 
others, because the board is used as the resting ground 
for those executives who have been with the company many 
years; and others because local prominent individuals are 
added merely for the prestige of their name, and not for 
what the individual can contribute to the board. It 
usually takes a long period of time and much soul searching 
to reduce the board to a more workable size~) The usual 
method of reducing the board's sise is through mortality 
and retirement; see the section on age of directors which 
follows. 
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2. Age of Board 
Since most individuals are just that - individuals, 
there is no ideal age for a director, or average age for a 
board of directors. The effectiveness of board members 
depends upon the individual's business sense, vigor, and 
· application to task. The man of fifty can lack the mental 
vigor of another man sixty-five, or even seventy years old. 
However, a board of directors averaging seventy years old 
is more likely to be less sharp and too conservative compared 
to a board with an average age of fifty-five to sixty years 
old. ( 1) 
Although too young a board may lack some maturity 
and administrative experience, the American Institute of 
Kanagement states that the real danger still lies in the 
board which may be too old, because the younger board can 
gain the maturity and administrative experience, whereas, 
the older board would find it most difficult, if not im-
possible, to change its ways. 
The "too old" board tends to shut the young blood 
out because it fears the disturbance of the younger individ-
uals. Even where younger men are allowed on the board, the 
two groups may find great difficulty in exchanging ideas. 
This is particularly true where an aging founder is still 
at the helm and is dogmatic to the point of dictatorship. 
These individuals generally succeed in isolating the company 
from current economic reality. 
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The following tables analyze the total number of 
directors listed in the survey questionnaire, both by total 
number and percentage of age group. 
TABLE IV 
Total Number of Directors by !ge Group 
by Financial Net Worth Classification 
Survey - Board of Directors 
in Electronics in New England, 
F.J.O'Driscoll,Graduate School,Boston University,Feb.1960 
TOTAL 1t0. UNDER 40 to OVER QT:WO.RTH REPLIES DIRECTORS 40 Yrs 60 Yrs 60 Yrs 
Over $1,000,000 23 188 16 142 30 
$500,000-$1,000,000 12 66 17 41 8 
$100,000-$500,000 11 55 13 36 6 
Under $100,000 1 1 41 18 18 5 
No Rating Available 21 124 26 89 
...2. 
TOTAL 78 474 90 326 58 
Source: Survey Questionnaire ("No Replies" Eliminated) 
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TABLE V 
Percentage Number of Directors by Age Group 
by Financial Net Worth Classification 
Survey - Board of Directors 
in Electronics in lfew England, 
F.J.O'Driscoll,Graduate School,Boston University,Feb.1960 
TOTAL lfO. UNDER 40 to OVER 
DT WORTH REPLIES DIRECTORS 40 Yrs 60 Yrs 60 Yrs 
Over $1,000,000 23 188 8~ 76~ 
$500,000-$1,000,000 12 66 26 62 
S1oo,ooo - S500,ooo 11 55 24 66 
Under $100,000 11 41 44 44 
llo Rating Available 21 124 21 72 
-
OVERALL 78 474 19~ 69~ 
Source: Survey Questionnaire 
Only an average of 8~ of the board members of 
companies rated over one million dollars were under forty 
years of age, but Heli Coil Corp. had 45% and Microwave 
Associates, Inc. had 37% in this age group. Electro-Flex 
Heat, Inc., rated under $100,000, had three members under 
forty and two members over sixty, an age gap of at least 
twenty years. 
The results indicate that the average age of the 
474 directors covered in the survey is approximately fifty 
years old. This is low when compared to an average of 
fifty-eight for 925 manufacturing companies in the United 
States~9 ) !he fifty year old figure is still lower when 
16~ 
12 
10 
12 
~ 
12% 
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compared to the average age of sixty-two in a national 
survey of 500 companies by the American Institute of 
Kanagement~ 1 ) These surveys were both conducted in 1959. 
It is interesting to note that as a percent in 
each category the percent of directors over sixty remains 
more or less constant, whereas, as the size of the company 
increases, the percent of younger men decreases. This is 
not because the companies with the greater size are old 
line companies - many of them are less than ten years old, 
but rather because as the company grows, the older directors 
are added because of mergers, public financing, and increased 
attractiveness for the mature director. The very young 
company usually can not command the services on its board 
of the prominent senior business man. 
In young companies, particularly in a young 
industry like electronics, boards are usually composed of 
younger-than-average directors. This is because of the 
recent technology and the necessity of more recent educa-
tion. Therefore, the average age of fifty is in line with 
the nature of the industry. 
As the Electronics Industry aatures, the average 
age will increase because the present directors are getting 
older and more outside, older directors will be added. The 
average age will increase each year until 1970 when it will 
probably be in line with the national average of fifty-eight 
to sixty years old. 
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3. "Inside" Directors 
The 80 companies in the survey had a total of 
244 "inside" directors, or as Table VI below shows, an 
average of 3 per company. However, this average contains 
fairly wide ranges, for example, eight out of ten Technology 
Instrument Corp. directors, and only one out of seven High 
Voltage Engineering Corp. directors, were listed as members 
of the "inside" group. 
:.ABLE VI 
Average Iumber of "Inside" Directors Per Company 
by Financial Het Worth Classification 
Survey - Board of Directors 
in Electronics Industry in Iew England, 
F.J.O'Driscoll,Graduate Sehool,Boston University,Feb.1960 
"INSIDE" .AVG. NO. PER 
NET WORTH REPLIES DIRECTORS COMPANY 
Over $1,000,000 23 80 3 
S5oo,ooo-t1,ooo,ooo 12 37 3 
$100,000-$500,000 11 33 3 
Under $100,000 13 37 3 
llo Rating .Available 21 57 
...L 
TOTAL 80 244 3 
Source: Survey Questionnaire 
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The term "inside" director as used here applies 
to those individuals who are executives of the company and 
active in its day to day operations. The use of the term 
is proper in this survey because, although it may not in-
clude all the directors who owe their position on the board 
to the operating management, for example, lawyers who are 
the general counsel of the company rather than representing 
some specific group on the board; nevertheless, it does in-
elude all the individuals who derive the major portion of 
their livelihood as a member of the day to day management. 
Conversely, the term "inside" director as used here may 
include some operating individual who owes his position to 
some compromise with minority investor interests, etc., 
and who is completely loyal to that group in his board 
participation. Generally, these questions are too sensitive 
to obtain any response in a mail survey. The question of 
"inside" versus "outside" boards is considered in Section 
III of this thesis. 
There is a further, although probably not 
important, possibility of misclassification as to the 
principal business background of the "inside" directors 
listed as administration; this is particularly true in 
the smaller companies. Generally, the president of the 
company has listed himself in the administration category, 
although this depends entirely upon the individual. 
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If, in fact, this is a new company headed up by an engineer 
who has done nothing but engineering in the past, he should 
be classified in Engineering and R & D. This is also true 
where the president has recently moved up and over from the 
job of Sales Ianager, Plant Manager, Comptroller, or some 
other job where he has not been responsible for the overall 
control of the company. The possibility of misclassification 
is not really important because he is E£! responsible for 
the overall control of the company. 
The business background of the "inside" directors 
as a class are: Administration 34%; Sales 14%; Production 
11%; Engineering and R & D 24%; and Finance and Accounting 
17%. Table VII distributes the "inside" directors numeri-
cally by size of company. Table VIII analyzes the same 
group by size of company as a percent of the total "inside" 
directors. 
(Table VII Follows) 
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TABLE VII 
Analzsis of "Inside" Directors 
by Principal Business Background 
bz Financial Net Worth Classification 
Survey - Board of Directors 
in Electronics Indust~ in New Ensland, 
28 
F.J.O'Driseoll1 Graduate Schoo~ Boston Universitz 1Peb.1260 
OVER S500K- $100M- UNDER NO RA!NG 
11000:M I1000I I500I $100M: .AVLBLE OVERALL 
.Administration 25 13 11 6 23 78 
Sales 11 7 5 2 8 33 
Production 10 3 4 4 4 25 
Engr. & R & D 18 4 8 14 11 55 
Fin. & Acct• 16 10 5 3 6 40 
No Replies 
- - -
8 
....2. ll 
- - -
TOTAL 80 37 33 37 57 244 
TOTAL COMPANIES 23 12 11 13 21 80 
Source: Survey Questionnaire 
(Table VIII Follows) 
U:BLE VIII 
Percentage Analysis of "Inside" Directors 
by Principal Business :Background 
by Financial Net Worth Classification, 
Survey - :Board of Directors 
in Electronics Industry in Hew England, 
F.J. O'Driscoll,Graduate School, Boston University,Feb.1960 
OVER $1OOM:- UNDER NO RATE 
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$1000)( $500X-$1000X $500M $100M AVAIL. OVERALL 
Administration 
Sales 
Production 
Engr. & R&D 
Fin. & Acct. 
TOTAL 
31% 
14 
12 
23 
20 
-
100% 
35% 
19 
8 
11 
27 
100% 
Source: Survey Questionnaire 
33% 21% 
15 7 
12 14 
24 49 
16 ___.2. 
100% 100% 
44% 
15 
8 
21 
12 
-
100% 
34% 
14 
11 
24 
....17. 
100% 
Note: "Io Replies" eliminated in computation of percents. 
a. Administration 
Directors concerned primarily with the overall 
administration of the company constitute 34% of the total 
"inside" directors. This question in the survey was in-
tended to include presidents, general managers, as well as 
staff aides to the presidents or general managers who 
fulfill the administrative role. Administrators lead the 
operating group and if their prior orientation in other 
areas is not predominant, they treat the various operating 
and staff sections with an objective eye. 
That the administrator should be objective and 
not lean to a particular operating or staff capability 
does not mean that he was not chosen to be the leader 
because of his particular operating or staff capability. 
Perhaps the best illustration of this apparent inconsis-
tency can be shown in a company as large as General Motors. 
Chronologically, when General Kotors needed new capital, a 
money raiser, W. c. Durant, was elected president. In a 
period of recession when the company was on the verge of 
bankruptcy, a specialist at taking companies out of such 
financial chaos, Pierre du Pont, was chosen as president. 
As competition increased, the engineering and marketing 
specialist, A. P. Sloan, Jr., was made chief executive. 
Then the problem area turned to union and government 
relations, thus C. E. Wilson moved up to president. 
When the postwar boom for cars came to an end, the competi-
tion increased, and again a marketing expert, H. c. Curtice, 
came to the helm. Today, with prices and costs rising at 
all levels, together with the du Pont stock problem, a 
financial man, F. c. Donner, leads General Motors.(6) 
Io one would argue that a president of General Motors does 
not have to be an able administrator. 
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b. Sales 
Salesmen accounted for 14% of the total operating 
people on the board. The salesman on the board can play a 
very important role in evaluating market trends and current 
research in terms of possible future markets. Also, through 
personal contact, he may have a wealth of knowledge on what 
is going on in other companies in non-sales activities. 
The value of the salesman for board participation 
depends upon whether he is merely an order taker or a well-
rounded marketing man who can aid the rest of the board in 
evaluating major advertising programs, customer concentra-
tion, the effect on sales of mergers and consolidations, 
and many other items of particular board interest. 
Engineers with a sales background make up the 
vast majority of salesmen in the Electronics Industry. 
There are some rather interesting exceptions to this rule, 
for example, the president and a board member of Hi-Voltage 
Engineering, Dennis Robinson, who was a college professor 
in England, does much of the selling for that company. 
The reason becomes apparent when you realize that much of 
this company's sales are in accelerators which cost in the 
hundreds of thousands of dollars per unit, and which are 
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sold to educational institutions for research work. Obviously ' 
with so large a unit cost, presidents and other officials of 
the institutions get involved in the purchasing of this 
equipment. This is where Jr. Robinson's background becomes 
an asset, because he is acquainted with the academic 
community and understands their feelings. Part of the 
problem in selling any commodity is understanding to whom 
you are selling. 
e. Production 
The "inside" board group is 11~ composed of 
production people. Less than one out of every three com-
panies surveyed had a production man on its board. The 
reason is probably that, because of the technology problem 
involved in electronics, the engineering people on the 
board feel that they also represent the production activity. 
This can be a bad mistake, because many times the engineering 
group can make an acceptable prototype but when the larger, 
and usually more rapid delivery, production contract comes 
along the product runs into difficulty in production. The 
engineering group with rather makeshift experimental gear 
and very few scheduling problem can not always anticipate 
the task of making the same unit in quantity. 
d. Engineering and R & D 
Approximately two out of three companies had 
engineering and/or R & D individuals on the director 
operating team, or an overall 24~ of the "inside" members. 
There was no continuity for the various size companies -
companies with a net worth under $100,000 had 49~ while e 
companies having a net worth from $500,000 to $1,000,000 
ha4 only 11~. It is interesting that companies having a 
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financial strength over $1,000,000bad 23~ or approximately 
the average for the industry, which indicates a balance 
for this activity in the larger companies. 
Perhaps the best way to illustrate the need of 
having engineering and R & D people on the board can be 
shown from information gathered from the company prospectus 
of Microwave Associates, Inc. and Technology Instrument 
Corporation. In 1957 Technology Instrument Corporation 
expended $1,000,000 on research and development, or 
approximately 18~ of sales. In 1958 Microwave Associates, 
Inc. expended $400,000, or approximately 15% of sales. 
The direct responsibility for such large expenditures 
should be represented on the board. 
One of the most difficult problems a board can 
face is that of evaluation of the research program. The 
very nature of research is intangible and its trend and 
output are evasive to measurement. 
Today some of the "outside" directors who repre-
sent large stockholder interests are engineering oriented 
because of the evaluation and technology problems. For 
example, Colonel J. z. Millar, Assistant Vice President, 
Development and Research, Western Union Telegraph Company 
and Frank L. Marx, Vice President in charge of Engineering 
American Broadcasting Company represent their respective 
companies as directors on the boards of Microwave Associates, 
Inc. and Technical Operations, Inc. Mr. Walkowicz, a 
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graduate in engineering from the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, is a representative director of Xr. Laurence 
Rockefeller on the Itek board. 
e. Finance and Accounting 
!he "Inside" director group is made up, on the 
average, of 17% by finance and accounting people. The 
percent varies considerably with the size of the company. 
For example, there are only 9~ on the boards of companies 
with a net worth under $100,000; whereas, there are 20% 
in the companies worth over $1,ooo,ooo. One out of every 
two companies in the survey had a finance person - generally 
the treasurer - on the board. 
The area of fiscal policy is usually the most 
important contribution the finance and accounting person 
can make to a board. The interpretive and generally rather 
conservative attributes of the finance and accounting man 
can also do a lot to add balance to board decisions. 
Erroneous decisions in the fiscal area can cause 
a company unnecessary grief in the near and long term. For 
example, Laboratory for Electronics, in an ill-advised move, 
capitalized rather extensive expenditures that had been made 
on computer research and prototypes. During the audit by 
the independent public accountants, Arthur Andersen and 
Company, the worth of this "asset" on the balance sheet 
came under severe scrutiny. The result was that the 
accountants refused to give an unqualified opinion as to 
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the financial status of the company. The overwhelming 
majority of companies write off their research costs when 
expended. 
The Laboratory for Electronics example is by no means 
unique. There is a tendency on the part of many individuals 
in management not to accept proper fiscal policies. These 
individuals are generally the first to discard a piece of 
obsolete machinery from the production line, and the last 
to want to see a charge for equipment obsolescence on the 
company's financial statements. It is the old analogy of 
the ostrich sticking its head in the sand. The accounting 
oriented person on the board can do much to educate and/or 
persuade these individuals toward a proper fiscal policy. 
4. "Outside" Directors 
Companies in the survey had an average of 3 
"outside" directors. The companies with a net worth over 
$1,000,000 had an average of 5, while the companies worth 
under $1,000,000 had an average of 3. It is interesting 
to note that the American Institute of Management has 
recommended 2 "outside" directors for the smaller company 
boards. 
(Table IX Follows) 
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!J!.ABLE IX 
Average :lumber of "Outside" Directors Per Company 
by Financial Net Worth Classification 
Survey - Board of Directors 
in Electronics Industry in New England, 
F.J.O'Driscoll,Graduate School,Boston University,Feb.1960 
NU14BER OF 
"OUTSIDE" AVG. NO. PER 
NET WORTH REPLIES DIRECTORS COMPANY 
Over $1,000,000 23 108 5 
$500,000 - $1,000,000 12 29 3 
$100,000 - $500,000 1 1 22 2 
Under $100,000 13 12 1 
Jlo Rating Available 21 67 
...L 
TOTAL 80 238 3 
Source: Survey Questionnaire 
*Note: Averages adjusted to difference between Table III 
and Table VI. 
The term "outside" director as used here refers 
to those individuals on the board who are not members of 
the day to day operating management. Although an "outside" 
director may owe his position to operating management, he 
generally does not make the major portion of his livelihood 
from this activity, and as such, is more or less independent. 
Of the 238 directors surveyed 45~ were businessmen in the 
same, related, or other industries; 43% were professional 
people, including lawyers, bankers, investment specialists, 
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and educators; and only 12% were minority, creditor or 
other special interest representatives. 
The sensitivity of stockholder representation 
on the board makes this a difficult question for a mail 
survey. Therefore, it is not possible to tell how many 
of the "outside" directors were management appointees, 
and how many were placed on the board by major stockholders. 
This is not always the important question anyway, because 
major stockholder representatives generally go along with 
a profitable management. It is only when the major stock-
holder wants to impose his will on operating management 
that the question of who represents whom becomes impor-
tant. This is an entirely separate question than whether 
or not the entire board is acting properly with regard to 
the general public -i.e., its fiduciary responsibility. 
The survey did not attempt to make analysis of 
any historical changes in the board; it was a static 
appraisal. Changes in the board can signal different 
results depending upon the circumstances. The board may 
be decreased to improve workability or eliminate a director 
who has been annoying the operating management control, or 
an increase may be made with management oriented directors 
to outvote the "outsiders." 
(Table X Follows) 
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TABLE X 
Analysis of "Outside" Directors 
by Principal Business Background 
by Pinancial Net Worth Classification 
Survey - Board of Directors 
in Electronics Industry in New England, 
P.J.O'Driscoll,Graduate School,Boston University,Feb.1960 
Businessmen, same 
ar related :hldustry 
Businessmen in 
other mdustries 
:Bankers & Jnv'est-
:rent Specialists 
Lawyers 
Professional 
Directors 
Educators 
Credi'tor 
Representatives 
Kinority Investor 
Representatives 
Other 
TOTAL 
TOTAL CO:MPAIIES 
OVER $500K- $100M- UNDER NO RAT OTER-
I1000K f1000K $500M $100M AVAIL. ALL 
30 
21 
32 
15 
2 
4 
1 
108 
23 
9 
7 
5 
4 
1 
29 
12 
6 
4 
5 
1 
2 
1 
22 
11 
5 
1 
2 
1 
12 
13 
17 
14 
17 
9 
1 
2 
___! 
67 
21 
64 
44 
61 
37 
2 
6 
2 
14 
8 
-
238 
80 
Source: Survey Questionnaire 
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TABLE XI 
Percent Analysis of "Outside" Directors 
by Principal Business Background 
by Financial Bet Worth Classification 
Survey - Board of Directors 
in Electronics Industry in New England, 
F.J.O'Driscoll,Graduate School,Boston University,Feb.1960 
OVER $500I- $100I- UNDER NO RAT OVER• 
$1000I $1000I S500M $100M AVAIL. ALL 
Bls:inessmen, same 
ar related indu.stry 
Businessmen in 
other industries 
Bankers & Invest-
ment Specialists 
Lawyers 
Professional 
Directors 
Educators 
Creditor 
Representatives 
Minority Investor 
Representatives 
Other 
TOTAL ~ 
"OUTSIDE" 
DIRECTORS 
TOTAL COMPANIES 
28" 
10~ 
29 
14 
2 
4 
3 
-
--....... 
100~ 
23 
31" 
10 
24 
17 
15 
--2. 
100% 
12 
Source: Survey Questionnaire 
14~ 
27 
18 
23 
5 
8 
--2. 
100~ 
1 1 
42% 
8 
25 
17 
8 
100" 
13 
25" 27~ 
21 18 
25 26 
13 16 
1 
2 3 
3 1 
5 6 
6 2 
100" roo" 
21 80 
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a. Businessmen in the Same or Related Industrz 
Each company had an average of one businessman 
in the same or a related industry. These individuals 
represent the largest group of "outside" directors, 
approximately 27~ of the total. 
The individuals in this category are for the 
most part customers, suppliers, and representatives of 
major stockholders. Their background makes them more or 
less conversant with problems particular to the industry. 
They can make a very important contribution, 
because of their industry relationship. It is generally 
easier for the operating management to accept advice and/ 
or criticism from someone who they feel more or less 
understands their objectives. 
b. Businessmen in Other Industries 
An average of one out of every two companies 
had a businessman on its board from another industry. 
These individuals represent 18% of the total "outside" 
directors. Although they may represent major stockholders, 
they may also make a very effective contribution by bringing 
a fresh approach to the board. 
A director from another industry may be just the 
right individual in some events. Por example, the elec-
tronics industry for the most part has not been hampered 
by labor unions. This is an asset to the operating manage-
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ment, but also a liability because of the inexperience if 
some labor difficulty should arise. The director from the 
other industry may be well founded in management-union 
relations and be just the answer to an otherwise unverse,d 
management. 
c. Bankers and Investment Specialists 
Kore than one out of every two companies on the 
average had a banker or investment specialist on the board. 
This class represented 26% of the "outside" directors. 
The value of bankers and investment specialists 
on the board generally is thatithese individuals complement 
the "inaide" financial people, have a wide and diversified 
background, and may provide a ready path into financial 
institutions when additional capital is required. 
The drawback to having a banker or investment 
specialist on the board can be that they are representing 
special interests, and as such are not looking after the 
general interest of the corporation. The banker who 
represents the institution financing current requirements 
will be much less likely to encourage a large capital 
outlay for fixed plant equipment because this may weaken 
the cash position and thus be detrimental to his special 
interest. 
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Another problem is once you have decided to get 
a banker on the board and. you make up your mind that your 
present banker is the man, you have the difficult problem 
of approaching the individual, for if he turns you down, 
your previously good relations may never be the same with 
that particular bank. To avoid this possible unpleasant-
ness, check the local list of directors to see if your 
banker is on a board - some banks refuse to allow their 
employees to serve on customer boards; next, feel out 
someone at the bank, other than the person you want, to 
see what the trend is; and next, if the previous investi-
(10) gation was successful, ask your man. ' 
d. J.ayers 
Perhaps the most consistent representation in 
the industry for all sizes of companies were lawyers. 
They represent an average of 16~ of "outside" directors, 
and approximately one out of every two companies had one 
on the board. 
The lawyer is on many boards for many various 
reasons. Some of the reasons are: being so close to the 
owner at the inception of the business, and so involved in 
its legal establishment, he is asked to be a director to 
fulfill the statutory requirements; the lawyer is very 
effective on the board of a company going through a special 
transistion. For example, a reorganization; and, many large 
stockholders select lawyers to represent them on the board. 
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In the first instance the general counsel on the 
board has a constant conflict of interest problems. For 
example, he is a supplier of legal services and he supplies 
himself as a director. This is true of other suppliers, 
but the lawyer as a professional man finds himself advising 
himself which is really an illogical situation. The above 
statement is not intended to include full time lawyers who 
are on the company's payroll. These individuals are "inside" 
directors. 
During reo~ganization, a lawyer can make an 
excellent board chairman, since this is the problem of 
the day and the lawyer is a specialist, just as if there 
were a production problem and a production specialist was 
put on the board. Generally, when the special situation 
is over, the lawyer should step down in favor of a business 
executive conversant with a going concern's problems. This 
is not an inflexibl~ rule because some lawyers have stayed 
on after the special situation and made a success of the 
venture on a go~ng concern basis. For example, Leonard H. 
Goldenson, President of American Broadcasting-Paramount 
Theatres, Inc. was originally a corporation lawyer who took 
over during a reorganization many years ago. Today the 
company is very successful with Goldenson still at the helm. 
Do not be offended if after asking your lawyer 
to be a board member he refuses. Some law firms, although 
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not many, have rules against members serving on clients' 
boards, because of the conflict of interest problems. 
e. Educators 
Only six of the 238 "outside" directors were 
educators, or approximately 3%. Of these six, four were 
in companies with a financial strength exceeding $1,000,000. 
Unless the educator has had some real practical experience, 
as most have, he is probably on the board for the sake of 
his or the company's prestige, and therefore, is not making 
an effective contribution to the board's activities. 
f. Creditor Representatives 
Only two, or approximately 1~,. of the "outside" 
directors were admitted to be creditor representatives, 
although it is possible that there are others who have 
been otherwise classified. These directors are obviously 
special interest people who are usually only found in 
companies which have some financial difficulty. 
g. Minority Investor Representatives 
Approximately 6~ of the "outside" directors were 
representatives of minority investors. Unless the company 
has bylaws allowing cumulative voting for directors, this 
group has little or no force and are on the board at the 
whim of management to avoid court and other entanglements. 
h. Others 
As a class the "others" amounted to 2~ of the 
"outside" directors, and for the most part were relatives 
put on the board to satisfy statutory requirements. 
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III "INSIDE" VERSUS "OUTSIDE" BOARDS 
In the United States today, the "Ownership 
Revolution" is in full swing. !he unprecedented level 
of the economy has created a large middle class investing 
group; meanwhile, the graduated income tax, except in very 
few eases, has virtually eliminated the concentration of 
wealth in the individual. Consolidation and merger, as 
well as economic growth, has built many corporations into 
giants with thousands of stockholders. These two facts, 
coupled with actual or contingent legislation, for example, 
the du Pont ruling which prevents the five du Pont directors 
on the General Motors board from exercising control, has 
made the management of many corporations independent of 
the investors who own their companies. As a matter of 
fact, of the 200 largest corporations, controlling over 
50% of manufacturing assets, at least one third have no 
stockholder who owns enough shares to influence management.( 6 ) 
Pension, mutual and insurance funds represent the 
largest group of investors today. Generally these funds 
have been most reluctant to impose any restrictions on the 
operating management, in fact many funds do not bother to 
vote their shares, and those that do generally "rubber 
stamp" the management. The funds live in fear of legis-
lation; the fear that management will "go to Washington" 
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against these bullies. The only method of censure that 
the funds use is to sell their interest in the corporation, 
which is really no censure at all. 
The "inside" management of some companies have 
declared themselves virtually independent of the board. 
They justify this declaration of independence upon the 
proposition that management is a professional group which 
should be allowed to set its own checks and balances, and 
take into its own hands the public responsibility of the 
corporation which heretofore had been vested in the board. {6) 
One of the proponents of this theory is Professor Stanley 
Vance, of the University of Massachusetts. His article 
Trends in :Boards, More Insiders,<14)concludes that "inside" 
boards are more democratic and therefore the best kind. 
The responsible members of the "inside" management 
realize that their job is to apply their management art to 
maximize profits. These people further realize that their 
day to day activities may tend to narrow their view, and 
therefore they welcome "Outsiders" on the board for the 
objectivity these people can supply. 
The .National Industrial Conference Board survey 
of 925 companies indicates that the companies were only 
43% controlled by "inside" boards.n( 9 bf the 80 companies 
surveyed in the Rew England Electronics Industry, 56~ 
were controlled by "inside" directors. It is important 
to point out, however, that only 39% of the companies 
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having a financial net worth over $1,000,000 were "inside" 
controlled, see Table XII below: 
Table XII 
"Inside" Versus "Outside" Control 
by ~inancial Net Worth Classification 
Survey - Board of Directors 
in Electronics Indust~ in New England 
F.J.O'Driscoll 1 Graduate School 1Boston Universitl-Feb.1960 
"INSIDE" "OUTSIDE" TOTAL ''INSIDE" "OUTSIDE" 
CON!ROL CONTROL REPLIES CONTROL CONTROL 
Over $1,000M 9 14 23 39% 61~ 
$500.M-$1,000:M 8 4 12 67 33 
$100M-$500M 10 1 11 91 9 
Under $10014 9 4 13 69 31 
No Rating 
_.2. 12 21 _u 
...21. Available 
TOTAL 45 35 80 56% 44~ 
Source: Survey Questionnaire 
Note: 50% considered "Inside" control. 
Any analysis of "inside" versus "outside" directors 
must presuppose that the "outside" director is a strong, 
experienced person who is capable of independent thinking 
or else his presence is without value. 
The "outside" director usually is a means to 
assuring the stockholder that his interests are being 
protected, especially in the area of management compensation. 
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In addition to this, the "outside" director in his part 
time capacity can give the smaller company a management 
depth and experience which it could not afford on a full 
time basis. 
Where management refuses to accept· the responsi-
bility for providing "outside" directors there is little 
the minority stockholder can do unless the state law allows 
or requires cumulative voting for directors, in which case 
the minority may find it possible to elect one or more 
directors of their own selection. 
In New England only two states, Rhode Island and 
Maine, have permissive statutes allowing cumulative voting 
if specifically provided in the charter or by-laws; the 
* other four states have no provision. The trend is d-efin-
itely toward cumulative voting w~th only 10 states having 
no provision (four of them in New England)! 4 ~lthough 
some rulings for individual corporations in "no provision" 
states seem to imply that cumulative voting would be 
acceptable, the majority view is that any such provision 
in the charter or by-laws of a corporation in a "no-pro-
vision" state would be wide open to judicial challenge.< 12 ) 
*Note: 
It is of particular interest to note that in 1955 
the Massachusetts Legislature enacted a permissive statute 
authorizing cumulative voting in the election of directors 
(chapter 173 of the Acts of 1955) but struck it out in 1956 
(chapter 375 of the Acts of 1956). Until this somewhat odd 
action of the Massachusetts Legislature it had been generally 
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supposed by many corporation lawyers in this state that 
cumulative voting was permitted under the broad terms of 
the organization statutes (G.L. chapter 155 and 156} and 
by a statement in Opinion of the Justices, 261 Mass. 556, 
596. 
There is, now, no question on the subject: 
cumulative voting is not legal in Massachusetts, especially 
since 1956. 
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IV COMMITTEES 
Many of the problems which a board may face 
require a substantial amount of detail work before any 
decision can be made. Some of these decisions require a 
considerable amount of follow up time to ensure that the 
board's decisions are being followed. Since the board 
only meets periodically, special committees of the board 
are established to perform the detail and follow up work. 
Due to historical usage in some companies, and the expressed 
wish of a dominant chief executive in others, some of these 
committees have usurped the power of the full board, i.e. 
have the power to act in its stead\5)This is not to condemn 
the use of committees, only the misuse, for a committee can 
be invaluable in cleaning away the routine and presenting 
to the full board only that information which the board 
should pass on. The executive, finance and wage and salary 
committees were used by more companies than any of the other 
committees. These were the only committees that had the 
power of the full board, see Table XIII below. 
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Table XIII 
Board Committees 
Humber of, and Percent Usage, bz the 80 Companies 
Survey - Board of Directors 
in Electronics Industry in New England 
F.J.O'Driscoll,Graduate School,Boston University,Feb.1960 
Number of Percent Ia. with Percent 
Companies of usage power to Power to 
Type of using this (80 Com- act for act for 
Committee Committee l!aniesl Board Board 
Executive 25 31,t; 14 56,t; 
Sales 2 3,t; 
Engineering 1 1,t; 
Production 1 1,t; 
Finance 9 11" 2 22~ 
Profit Sharing 1 1" 
Retirement Plan 1 1" 
Wage and Salary 10 13~ 4 40~ 
Building 1 1~ 
Donations 1 1" 
1. Executive Committee 
The executive committee is used by 25, approx-
imately 31~, of the 80 companies surveyed. The American 
Institute of Ianagement's survey of 500 larger corporations 
show a 75% use of an executive committee~ 1 )The size differ-
ential explains the variance because, as Table XIV shows, 
none of the companies with a financial strength under 
$100,000 used an Executive Committee and over $100,000 the 
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52 
percent increased by size of company. There was a 52~ use 
of executive committees by the companies rated over $1,000,000. 
in financial strength, this percentage is more in line with 
the 500 company average. 
Table XIV 
Use of Executive Committees 
by Financial Iet Worth Classification 
J.J.O'Driscol~ Graiuate School1 Boston Universit~ Fe~ 1260 
Over S500I $100)( Under lfo Rat. 
$1000)( $1000I $500)( $100. Avail. Total 
lfumbc;tr using 
Comaittee 12 4 4 5 25 
Total Replies 23 12 11 13 21 80 
Percent Usage 52~ 33~ 33" 25~ 31~ 
Humber having 
Power of Board 5 4 2 3 14 
Percent of 
Committees 42" 100" 50~ 60" 56" 
Approximately 56" of all the executive committees 
reported had the power to act for the full board, rather 
than to merely make recommendations. lo attempt was made 
in the questionnaire to determine whether actions were 
subject to any further ratification by the full board. 
Among the companies which replied to this question, 
the executive committees of Geartronics Corporation, Tech-
nical Operations, Incorporated, Technology Instrument Corp., 
and Waterbury Pressed Ketal Co. had the power to act for 
the board; whereas the same committee in the Heli-Coil Corp. 
and H. H. Scott, Inc. did not. 
The powers of the executive committee may be 
written into the by-laws, or merely passed down by the 
board. Although it is not· a New England Electronic Com-
panJ, the by-law requirements of the executive committee 
of the E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company may serve as 
an excellent examplea 
The by-laws provide that between monthly 
meetings of the board the executive com-
mittee; •••• shall possess and may exercise 
all the powers ot the Board of Directors 
in the management and direction of all the 
business and affairs of the company •••••• 
in such a manner as the Executive Committee 
shall deem best for the interest of the 
company in all oases in which specific 
directions shall not have been given by 
the Board of Directors. 
This committee is limited only by certain financial, audit 
and bonus and salary matters which are reserved for the 
other board committees. The executive committee consists 
ot the president and nine vice-presidents, and it is almoat 
autonomousa "Bo one in du Pont •••• would make the mistake 
of attributing top company authority anywhere but to the 
executive committee." (6) 
Whether or not this degree of autono~ exists in 
the executive committees in the electronic companies sur-
veyed, is questionable, but the example points up the 
problem, namely, that the "inside" members may usurp the 
power of the full board, even if the "inside" directors 
are not a majority. This would leave the full board with 
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little or no authority and the operating management acts 
as its own meDtor. 
2. Officer and Employee Compensation Committees 
The next most used committeefound in the 80 
companies were those dealing with compensation, including 
wage and salary (13%), profit sharing (1%) and retirement 
plan (1~), a total of 15%. Compensation committees were 
found in 46% of the companies rated over $1,000,000. This· 
is substantially over the 25% average computed by the Ameri-
can Institute of Management in its 500 company survey. 
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It is important that compensation committees have 
"outside" director representation, particularly those listed 
for public investment. Otherwise, the general public investor 
has no assurance that operating management is not setting 
compensation, i.e. salaries, wages, stock options, etc., 
that is unreasonable, and to the investor's detriment. 
3. Finance Committee 
Board committees which establish policy on 
financial matters were present in 11% of the companies. 
Some of the areas usually controlled by a finance committee 
are capital acquisitions, inventory accumulation, extension 
of credit, and state of the assets. 
V MEETINGS 
One method of measuring the activity of the board 
is to examine the frequency and length of meetings. Although 
frequency and length of meetings may be unscientific methods 
of appraisal of board participation, the results of this 
method have been otherwise correlated, and other analysts 
of board activity have used the method successfully, among 
them The National Industrial Conference Board, The American 
Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc., and The American 
Institute of Management. 
1. Frequency 
A survey of 925 companies has revealed that 56~ 
held meetings once per month, and 44~ held meetings 10 tiaes 
per year or less. The electronic companies surveyed for 
this thesis were not consistent, as a group, with the 925 
company average because only 38~ held meetings at least 
once per month, although 52~ of companies rated over 
$1,000,000 held meetings at least once per month. 
(Table XV Follows) 
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TABLE XV 
Frequency of Board Meetings 
by Financial Net Worth Classification 
Survey - Board of Directors 
in Electronics Industry in Iew England 
F.J.O'Driscoll, Graduate School. :Boston University, Feb.1960 
Over $500K $100M Under No Rat. 
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Frequency $1000K $1000I I500K $100M Avail Total ~ 
Weekly 
Monthly 
Bi-Monthly 
Quarterly 
Semi-Amnally 
Annually 
Tctal Canpm:ies 
Avg.~ 
Per Year 
12 
2 
7 
1 
1 
23 
8 
3 
1 
3 
4 
-
-
11 
6 
1 
3 
1 
2 
1 
.2. 
1 1 
10 
1 
2 
1 
_]_ 
11 
8 
1 
6 
3 
6 
2 
_]_ 
21 
8 
Source: Survey Questionnaire ~o Replies" Eliminated) 
2. Length of Meetings 
3 
26 
7 
19 
8 
1! 
77 
8 
The average company surveyed had board meetings 
that lasted three hours, this average was also true of the 
companies rated over $1,000,000 in financial strength. 
4~ 
34 
9 
25 
10 
18 
-
Table XVI indicates the average length of each board meeting. 
(Table XVI Follows) 
!able XVI 
Average Length of Each Board •eeting in Hours 
by Financial Net Worth Classification 
Survey - Board of Directors 
in Electronics Industry in New England 
F.J. O'Driscoll, Graduate School, Boston University, Feb. 1960 
Over 1500K $100M Under Io Rat. Length 
in llfrrs. I1000M I1000K I500M $100M Avail. Total ~ 
1 
2 
4 
6 
8 
Total 
Companies 
-
2 
6 
12 
2 
1 
23 
2 
3 
4 
2 
11 
1 
6 
1 
11 
4 
7 
-
11 
3 
5 
1 
10 
1 
1 
21 
8 
22 
11 
29 
5 
2 
77 
Source: Survey Questionnaire ("No Replies" Eliminated) 
3. Hours Per Year 
10 
29 
13 
38 
7 
.2 
100~ 
The most important analysis of this subject can 
be found in Table XVII, the length of board meetings in 
hours per year. This is true because obviously there is 
more boari activity in a companJ which meets two hours per 
month (24 hours per year) than a company which meets six 
hours per semi-annual meeting {12 hours per year). 
(Table XVII Follows) 
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!able XVII 
Length of Board Meetings in Hours Per Year 
by Financial Net Worth Classification 
Survey - Board of Directors 
in Electronics Industry in New England 
:r. • O'Driscoll, Graduate School, Boston University, Feb. 1960 
Hours Over $50011 $10011 Under :No Rat. 
l!erYr. 1100011 1100011 150011 110011 Avail Total 
...L 
i- 12 4 4 5 9 9 31 41~ 
13 
- 24 11 5 3 1 5 25 33 
25 
- 52 __.! 2 
--2. 1 6 20 26 
- - -
Total B!pllis 23 11 11 11 20 76 100~ 
Avg. per Yr -Hrs. 23 18 18 10 19 19 
Source: Survey- Questionnaire ("Io Replies" Eliminated) 
More than 59% of the Iew England electronic com-
panies spent at least 12 hours per year in board meetings. 
The average of one hour per month has been considered the 
minimum requirement by the !aerican Institute of Management 
and any amount less than this may indicate a perfunctory 
board which is not performing in accordance with its respon-
sibilities. 
4. Meeting Preparation 
A good meeting usually is one that is well pre-
pared, with a clear preset agenda. Any- supporting informa-
tion to be supplied the board should be distributed suffi-
ciently in advance to allow the board members to digest the 
facts and issues at hand. 
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The agenda is a matter of considerable importance, 
especially to the "outside" directors. If the "outside" 
directors are only allowed to see what is allowed for in 
the agenda, then there is little chance that the "outside" 
members will discover trouble until it becomes evident from 
the financial statements, which is generally too late. One 
method of preventing a management predigested agenda is to 
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have an agenda committee which will include "outside" directors 
on a revolving basis. This "outside" director{s) should be 
allowed a free hand in investigating matters to be put on 
the agenda. 
VI COMPENSATIOI OF DIRECTORS 
In prior periods of our economic history the 
director was usually a major stockholder who was looking 
after his own interests, and as such needed no additional 
compensation. Many companies paid a token gold piece tor 
director attendance. Today., !!2!!1 of the directors are 
"inside" management people or "outside" directors, who do 
not own large amounts of stock. These directors, especially 
those fulfilling their proper functions, should be adequately 
compensated. The matter of director compensation, today, is 
generally a two headed coin because a company must pay 
enough to attract talented individuals, yet not so much 
that the fee becomes all important to the director and his 
judgment is influenced by it. 
1. "Inside" Directors 
Information on "inside" director compensation 
(Table XVIII) indicates that only 14~ of the companies, 
representing 14~ of the management directors, receive addi-
tional compensation for their director activity. 
~able XVIII Follows) · 
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Table XVIII 
Kethod of Compensation of "Inside" Directors 
by Financial Net Worth Classification 
Survey - Board of Directors 
in Electronics Industry in New England 
F. J. 0 'Driscoll, Graduate School, :Boston University, Feb. 1960 
lfWDber of 
Companies 
Part c:L atiEr 
Salary 
Additional 
Compensation 
Total 
Replies 
llumber of 
Directors 
l8.rt of other 
Salary 
Additional 
Compensatiom. 
Total 
Over $500K $100K Under Io Rat. 
$1000K S1000K S500K $100M Avail. Total ~ 
15 12 8 
~ 
22 12 1 1 
59 37 22 
21 
-
11 
- -
80 37 33 
11 19 
1 
11 20 
29 53 
2 
-
29 55 
65 86% 
11 ll. 
76 100% 
200 86% 
34 ll. 
234 100% 
!he majority view is that the "inside" director is adequately 
compensated for his director activity by his ordinary salary. 
Some feel, as this writer does, that directorship entails 
additional legal duties which should be compensated. At 
the very least that portion of the total salary which could 
be reasonably associated with director activities should be 
segregated and paid separately. This method would point up 
to the "inside" director that his board activity should be 
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considered as separate and distinct from his operating re-
sponsibility - that he is wearing his second hat and is 
being paid to perform that job. 
2. "Outside" Directors 
Approximately 39~ of the electronic companies 
reporting did not compensate "outside" directors. These 
individuals, 41~ of the "outside" directors, probably 
represent major stock interests and are therefore, com-
pensated by the owners thereof. Annual fees were paid by 
31~ of the companies that paid some compensation, the re-
maining 69~ paid per meeting fees. 
(Table XIX Follows) 
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!able XIX 
Method of Compensation of "Outside" Directors 
by Financial Net Worth Classification 
Survey - Board of Directors 
in Electronics Indust!l in New England 
F.~ O'Driscolb Graduate Schoob Boston Universitb Feb.1960 
.lumber of Over $500K $100M Under No Rat. 
Companies $1000I S1000I $50011 $100M Avail. Total 
Annual Fee 4 1 3 1 3 12 
Ier lleetmg Fee 14 6 4 6 30 
Not Conpmated 
..2. 2 2 .2. .2. .11. 
-
Total · 
Replies 21 9 9 6 14 59 
Number of 
Directors 
Annual Fee 17 6 3 2 12 40 
Per Ieet:ilg Fee 60 17 15 16 108 
JOt Canpensated 21 6 
_! 10 18 _a 
- -
Iumber of 
Directors 98 29 22 12 46 207 
The companies which reported a dollar amount paid 
an average per meeting fee of f50.00, which is $600.00 per 
year. The National Industrial Conference Board survey of 
925 companies reveals that the average company paid a per 
.meeting fee of $100.00, or $1,200.00 per year. That survey 
also showed that 30% of all companies paid an annual fee, 
and 10% allowed directors to participate in employee fringe 
benefits.(g) 
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.:A 
20 
51 
~ 
100% 
19% 
52 
£2. 
100% 
Bote: Por income tax purposes the director is not an 
employee, he is a self-employer, and as such, income tax 
should not be witheld from his pay. As a self-employer he 
should pay a self-employment tax. Legal fees paid to de-
fend stockholder and other suits are deductible. 
(Internal Revenue Code, 1954). 
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VII Functions and Responsibilities 
The image of the director has been molded in 
the preceding sections, this section presents his role 
in the corporation, the reason for his existence. To 
make a good director a man has to have the fundamental 
qualifications of character, ability, and breadth~ 
viewpoint, including a sense of business ethics and 
public responsibility, plus long range foresight as 
distinguished from a dependency upon expediency.(2) 
The directors are responsible for the management 
of the corporation; they are legally bound to that degree 
of care which ordinarily prudent and diligent men would 
exercise under similar circumstances. This broad defini-
tion was laid down in Briggs vs. Spaulding, 141 u.s. 132, 
by the u. s. Supreme Court; any less a standard would 
relieve the directors of that responsibility necessary 
for the conduct of a business, any more strict a standard 
would prevent men from accepting the position which 
ordinarily offers only token payment. 
The board has two major roles - trusteeship and 
administration. The two roles are interdependent since 
the trusteeship sets the task, and administration provides 
the means for fulfilling the task. 
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1. Trusteeship 
Corporate directors have a fiduciary responsi-
bility for the successful operation of the corporation, 
including earnings and dividends for the stockholders, 
and jobs and adequate wages for the employee. The great 
depression of the 1930's proved that the irresponsibility 
of directors, through f~audulent statements and fast 
dealings, could set the economy aside and cause misery 
for millions. If the directors of today abdicate their 
responsibility another learned man might have to write 
the following, as did the Hon. Harlan F. Stone in 1934: ( 12 ) 
I venture to assert that when the history 
of the financial era which haw just drawn 
to a close comes to be written, most of 
its mistakes and its major faults will be 
ascribed to the failure to observe the 
fiduciary principle. 
The responsibility of the directors stem from 
two basic sources, 1.) statutes and 2.) additional 
requirements contained in the charter and the by-laws. 
These responsibilities include selecting and electing 
officers; setting executive salaries, bonus plans, and 
pensions; determining dividend policy; selecting and 
dealing with auditors; determining basic policies and 
broad courses of business; reviewing, appraising, and 
controlling over-all results with budgets, reports, and 
inspections; and otherwise representing, safeguarding, 
and furthering stockholders and the public interest. 
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fhe directors are the exclusive, executive 
representatives of the corporation and are charged with 
the management and use of the assets. The stockholders 
can not inquire into their actions unless fraud or bad 
faith can be shown. Nevertheless, the directors may not 
sell the entire assets of a solvent corporation without 
the prior approval of the stockholders, although in most 
states the directors may make a general assignment of 
the assets if the corporation is insolvent. 
2. Administration 
The administration of the corporation in its 
broadest concept is merely developing and implementing 
policies to insure that the trustee principle is being 
adhered to. These policies are the pathways out out for 
the operating management. The board must stick to policy 
making, leaving operating activities to the operating 
management, but if it sees some operating activities 
leading to a major policy problem, it should step in and 
make the policy decision immediately to avoid further 
conflict. 
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VIII Conclusion 
This thesis has presented, for the first time, 
a specific analysis of the boards of directors in the New 
England Electronics Industry. The presidents of more than 
50 companies have requested a condensed summary of the re-
sults of this survey. It is reasonable to assume that 
some of these presidents will use this information to more 
effectively compose and guide their respective boards. 
Logically, the average person might assume, par-
ticularly of the smaller companies surveyed, that in this 
type of industry, with its youth and recent technology, 
the board members are younger than average; and that more 
boards are controlled by the original founders, present in 
the "inside" management group. These assumptions are borne 
out by the thesis results. 
The larger companies surveyed have boards which 
equal, or excel, the national averages in composition and 
performance. This is most probably because almost 70% of 
these companies are listed for public investment, and 
therefore, subject to the stringent requirements of many 
more regulatory agencies and laws. The electronic companM 
boards are less cumbersome (8 members versus 11 members); 
younger (50 years versus 60 years); less controlled by 
"inside management (39% versus 43~); and more prone to 
attention to the vital area of employee compensation (46~ 
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/ 
I 
have Compensation Committees versus 25% nationally}. 
!he writer recommends that, where lacking, more 
production oriented people should be added to the board. 
Also, there should be a segregation of that part of the 
executive's salary which could be reasonably associated 
with his board. activities. !his method of payment, although 
adding nothing to the "inside" directors total salary, wottld 
enable that director to realize his dual responsibility. 
Professor Wayne G. Broehl, Jr. of Dartmouth 
College, in an address to the Investment Casting Institute, 
Rew York, 1959, has summed up the pulse of New England 
Electronic Industry Boards in the following statement: 
I am constantly impressed by the vitality 
of some of our New England companies in 
facing their regional, national, and even 
international responsibilities. It is 
interesting that these progressive firms 
generally have strong boards of directors. 
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A. General 
Appendix A 
Legal Supplement 
The statutes, charter, or by-laws may specifically 
prohibit some person or class of persons from serving as 
directors.' In the absence of a provision to the contrary, 
anyone who is legally competent may serve as a director. 
Therefore, among othera, this excludes infants, insane 
persons, and married women unless there is a statute re-
moving the disability of married women at common law. 
Unless specifically required by statute, charter, or by-
laws directors need not own stock. The following specific 
statutes will provide some legal background to board com-
position. 
B. Specific Statutes in New England -
1. Requirements for Directors 
a. Connecticut 
Directors shall be stockholders, except when 
a corporation owns stock in another corporation, 
in which case one, and only one, director of the 
other corporation may be a director or executive 
officer or agent of the owning corporation, and 
he himself need not own stock. (Chapter 250, 
Section 5165, 1949) 
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b. Kaine 
Directors must be and remain stockholders, 
except that a member of another corporation, which 
owns stock and has a right to vote thereon, may be 
a director. (R.S. as amended, Chap. 56. Sec. 31) 
c. Massachusetts 
Every director, unless the by-laws otherwise 
provide shall be a stockholder. (Chap. 156, Sec.22 
G. L., 1932) 
d. Iew Hampshire 
There is no provision requiring a director to 
be a stockholder, therefore, the general rule applies 
that he need not be a stockholder in the absence of 
specific provision. 
e. Rhode Island 
Directors need not be stockholders unless the 
charter, articles of incorporation, or by-laws 
specifically require. (G.C.L., as amended,Sec.19) 
f. Vermont 
All directors must be stockholders, except in 
the interval between formation of the corporation 
and the issue of stock. (G.C.L., as amended,S~5779) 
2. Number of Directors 
a. Connecticut 
The property and affairs of each corporation 
shall be managed by three or more directors. 
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(Chapter 250, Section 5165, 1949) 
b. Maine 
There shall not be less than three directors 
(R.S. as amended, Chapter 56, Section 31) 
c. Massachusetts 
The businews of every corporation shall be 
managed by the president, clerk, treasurer, and 
other officers and agents; and by a board of not 
less than three directors. (Chapter 156,Section 
21, G.L., 1932) 
d. Hew Hampshire 
There shall be a board of not less than three 
directors. (Chap 274, Sec. 30, Rev. Laws, 1942) 
e. Rhode Island 
Every corporation may have a board of directors 
of such number and such officers as the charter, 
articles of association, or by-laws may prescribe. 
(G.C.L., as amended, Section 19) 
f. Vermont 
The affairs of a corporation which is to have 
a capital stock, according to its articles of 
association, shall be managed by a board of not 
less than three directors. (G.c.L. as amended, 
Section 5779). 
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3. Election of Directors 
a. Connecticut 
Directors shall be chosen annually by the 
stockholders at such time and place as may be 
provided by the by-laws. The directorsuay fill 
any vacancy in their number for the unexpired 
portion of the term or until such corporation 
shall fill such vacancy. (Chapter 250,Section 
5165, 1949). 
b. Maine 
Directors shall be chosen annually and continue 
in office until others are chosen and qualified in 
their stead. (R.S. as amended,Chapter 56,Section 
31). 
c. Massachusetts 
The directors, treasurer, and clerk shall be 
elected annually bylallot, by such stockholders 
as have the right to vote, and the president shall 
be elected annually by and from the board of direc-
tors. (Chap 156, Sec. 22, G.L., 1932). 
d. Kew Hampshire 
The board of directors shall be elected annually. 
(Chap. 274, Se. 89, 1942) 
e. Rhode Island 
The manner of election may be prescribed by 
charter, articles of association or by-laws. 
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Unless otherwise provided in the by-laws, vacancies 
in the board may be filled by the board of directors. 
(G.C.L., as amended, Section 19). 
f. Vermont 
The board of directors shall be elected 
annually. (G.C.L., as amended, Sec. 5779). 
4. Director Terms 
a. Connecticut 
Directors shall hold office for one year, or 
until the next annual meeting, or until others 
shall be chosen and shall have been qualified in 
their stead. Io directors shall be elected for 
less than one year nor for a longer period than 
five years (Chap. 250, Sec. 5165, 1949). 
b. Jlaine 
Directors - shall continue in office until 
others are chosen and qualified in their stead. 
Bothing shall prohibit their election for a longer 
term than one year (R.S., as amended, Chap. 56, 
Section 31). 
e. Massachusetts 
A corporation may divide its directors into 
classes and pres.eri be the tenure of office for the 
several classes and the class of stock by which each 
class of directors shall be elected, but no class 
shall be elected for a shorter period than one year 
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or for a longer period than five years. The term 
of office for at least one class shall eipire each 
year. (Chap. 156,Sec. 22, G.L. 1932). 
d. New Hampshire 
Unless otherwise provided in the by-laws, the 
officers and directors shall hold office for one 
year and until their successors shall be chosen 
and qualified. (Chap. 274, Se. 89, Rev. Laws,1942). 
e. Rhode Island 
The terms of office will be prescribed by the 
charter, articles of association, or by-laws. 
(G.C.L., as amended, Section 19). 
f. Vermont 
Unless otherwise provided in the Articles of 
Association, directors shall be elected annually 
by the stockholders, and hold office for one year, 
or until a successor is elected and qualified. 
(G.c.L., as amended, Sec. 5779). 
75 
Dear Sir: 
Appendix B 
Francis J. O'Driscoll 
40 Samoset Road 
Woburn Mass. 
February 17, 1960 
1 am currently writing a thesis on the 11 Boards of Directors in 
the Electronics Industry in New England 11 as a partial requirement for a 
Masters Degree in Business Administration at Boston University. Since 
the best source of information is obviously from the companies in the 
industry, I have prepared the enclosed questionnaire which takes only a 
few minutes to complete. This questionnaire has been sent to over 500 
companies in the industry in New England. 
The information requested will be used in statistical form, 
and no direct mention will be made of your company unless you specifically 
give your permission on Page 3 of the questionnaire. If you believe that 
a particular question will compromise some proprietary information, please 
pass that question and complete the others. 
The thesis will be complete in June 1960, and at that time a 
condensed summary, approximately ten pages, will be available at cost, 
approximately one dollar. A self-addressed stamped envelope is enclosed 
for your convenience. 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
Sincerely, 
Francis J. O'Driscoll 
Enc. 
76 
11The Board of Directors in the Electroncis Industry 
in New England 11 
Survey Questionnaire 
by Francis J. O'Driscoll 
Com an : 
1 .) How many directors in your company? 
2.) How many 11 inside 11 directors? 
3.) What are their principal business backgrounds? 
Please indicate the number in each category. 
a.) Administration 
b.) Sales 
c.) Production {including Purchasing) 
d.) Engineering and R & D 
e.) Finance and Accounting 
4.) How many 11outside 11 directors? 
5.) What are their principal business backgrounds? 
Please indicate the number in each category. 
a.) Businessmen in the same or related fields 
b.) Businessmen in other industries 
c.) Bankers 
d.) Lawyers 
e.) Investment specialists 
f.) Professional directors 
g.) Educators 
h.) Creditor representatives 
i .) Minority investor interests 
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6.) Age of directors - please indicate the number of directors 
who are 
Under 40 Be tween 40 - 60 __ Over 60 
--
7.) Frequency of board meetings - please (x) one. 
a.) Weekly e.) Quarterly-----
b.) Bi-weekly f.) Semi -Annua 11 y __ _ 
c.) Monthly g.) Annually-----
d.) Bi-monthly 
8.) Average duration of meetings - please (x) one. 
a.) t hour d.) 6 hours 
b.) hour e.) 8 hours 
c.) 4 hours f.) More than 8 hours 
---
9.) Board committees - please indicate with an (x) if your 
company has an: 
a.) Executive committee 
b.) Finance committee 
c.) Wage and salary committee 
10.) If there are other board committees, please specify: 
a.) ______________ __ 
b.) ____________ _ 
c.) ______________ __ 
11 .) Do the committees have the power to act for the board, or 
merely recommend actions? Yes 
--
No. ___ _ 
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12.) Compensation of directors- how are your directors compensated? 
Please indicate with an {x) whichever is applicable. 
a.) 11 lnside 11 directors: 
I.) Director compensation is a part of other salary ______ ___ 
2.) Additional compensation is given for directorship 
b.) 110utside 11 directors: 
I.) Annual ·fee 
2.) Per meeting fee 
3.) Combination of annual and per meeting 
4.) Not compensated 
13.) May I make specific mention of your company in my thesis? 
Please indicate your approval by signing your name 
immediately below: 
Signed _________________________________ __ 
14.) Would you I ike a ten page summary of this subject at an 
approximate cost of one dol Jar. Yes ______ _ No ______ ___ 
Signed _____________________________________ __ 
Title 
Date 
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